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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the 
lower court are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. On the basis of the record before it, did the 
trial court correctly determine that appellee, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, did not breach its duty of good faith to its 
insureds? 
2. On the basis of the record before it, did the 
trial court correctly determine that even if Liberty Mutual had 
breached its duty of good faith, the insureds had failed, in 
answers to interrogatories and in responsive memoranda, to place 
before the court sufficient evidence that they had sustained 
damages as a result of such breach? 
3. On the basis of the record before it, did the 
trial court correctly determine that as a matter of law the 
insureds were not entitled to punitive damages even if a breach 
of the duty of good faith by the insurer could be shown? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The d i s t r i c t court's conclusions of law regarding each 
issue are reviewed de novo by th i s Court. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-303(5) (1987): 
31A-26-303. Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices. 
(5) This section does not create any private 
cause of action. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(a) (1989): 
78-18-1.. Basis for Punitive Damages Awards-
Section Inapplicable to DUI cases—Division 
of Award with State. 
(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided by 
statute, punitive damages may be awarded only 
if compensatory or general damages are 
awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tort feasor are the result 
of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward 
and a disregard of, the rights of oth€»rs. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case began as an action for declaratory relief 
wherein the plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, sought a 
declaration that it was not obligated to satisfy a default 
judgment obtained by its insureds, defendants Joanne Baxter and 
Mary Ellen Boulter, against an allegedly uninsured motorist, 
Daryl Crape. It was the insureds' position that the Judgment 
should be satisfied pursuant to Liberty Mutual's obligations 
under the uninsured motorist coverage section of its policy. 
Liberty Mutual asserted that it was not obligated to satisfy the 
Judgment because: 1) the Judgment was invalid as the court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the allegedly uninsured 
motorist, 2) under the terms of Liberty Mutual's insurance 
policy, any judgment obtained by the insured against an uninsured 
motorist without first obtaining the prior written consent of 
Liberty Mutual was not binding, and 3) no reasonable evidence 
establishing that the other motorist, Mr. Crape, was uninsured 
had been submitted to Liberty Mutual. 
Defendants' Answer to the Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief set forth as affirmative defenses the doctrines of res 
judicata, laches and estoppel. Six months later, on July 10, 
1990 the defendants (the insureds) filed a Counterclaim wherein 
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it was alleged that Liberty Mutual had breached its duty of good 
faith to the insureds by "failure to timely and diligently 
investigate its liability exposure to its insureds." (R. 00043.) 
Through the course of the litigation Liberty Mutual was 
not able to set aside the Default Judgment, nor convince the 
court that its policy language was binding. Through the efforts 
of a private investigator, it was discovered that Mr. Crape was 
uninsured. Therefore, Liberty Mutual satisfied (to the extent of 
its policy limits) the Judgment obtained by the insureds and paid 
to the insureds interest at the legal rate from the date of the 
Judgment to the date of payment. Thereafter all that remained 
was defendants' Counterclaim for bad faith. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment regarding the defendants' claim for bad faith. 
Liberty Mutual7s position was that as a matter of law, Liberty 
Mutual's conduct did not constitute bad faith, that the 
defendants had sustained no damages, and that Liberty Mutual's 
conduct could not, in any event, support an award for punitive 
damages. 
Disposition in Court Below 
By Minute Entry dated December 10, 1991 the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya granted Liberty Mutual's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. By Order dated December 23, 1991 the court entered 
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judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company: "For the 
reasons set forth in [Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's] 
November 15, 1991 Memorandum of Points and Authorities." (R. 
00454, Minute Entry; R. 00459-560, Order and Judgment.) No memorandum 
decision was issued by the court. 
Relief Sought On Appeal 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company requests this Court to 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At times relevant to this action, Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company insured Joanne Baxter and Mary Ellen Boulter 
pursuant to a standard automobile liability insurance policy 
which contained typical Utah personal injury protection benefits 
coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. (R. 00337-00338.) The 
uninsured motorist coverage, which is most critical here, 
contained the following limitation with regard to suits brought 
by the insured against an uninsured motorist: 
Any judgment for damages arising out of a 
suit brought without our written consent is 
not binding on us. 
(R. 00338.) 
On April 28, 1989 an automobile driven by Joanne Baxter 
and an automobile driven by Daryl Crape collided on the off ramp 
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of 1-215 at Redwood Road in Salt Lake County, Utah. Joanne 
Baxter's mother, Mary Ellen Boulter, was a passenger in the 
Baxter vehicle at the time of the accident. (R. 00334.) Although 
on the day of the accident Liberty Mutual was informed by its 
insureds that an accident had occurred, the record in this case 
reveals that it was not until August 8, 1989 that Liberty Mutual 
received any indication that the other driver, Daryl Crape, may 
have been uninsured. The first mention of an uninsured motorist 
appears in the Record at page 00144 which is a letter from 
appellee's counsel Robert M. McRae to Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company. Although the letter is dated July 12, 1989, it was not 
received until August 8, 1989. * 
The letter received by Liberty Mutual on August 8, 1989 
stated that a Summons and Complaint and Return of Service is 
enclosed with the letter. That Complaint initiated the lawsuit 
filed by the insureds against Daryl Crape. (R. 00138.) The 
letter also advised Liberty Mutual that the process agent who 
served the Summons did not personally serve Mr. Crape and noted 
1
 As is conceded by counsel in a memorandum in opposition to 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's initial motion for partial 
summary judgment, on August 8, 1989 during a "follow-up telephone 
conversation" initiated by the insureds' counsel, Liberty Mutual 
advised its insureds' counsel that Liberty Mutual never received 
the July 12, 1989 letter. (R. 00177-00178; R. 00149, letter from Liberty 
Mutual to insureds' counsel explaining July 12, 1989 correspondence not received 
until August 8, 1989.) The insureds' counsel then faxed the July 12, 
1989 letter to Liberty Mutual on that date. (R. 00149.) 
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that Mr. Crape was in the process of moving to Oregon. Lastly, 
the letter stated: 
We are further led to believe [Crape] was 
uninsured at the time of the accident. 
(R. 00144.) 
The record reveals that no additional information was 
provided to substantiate the insureds' counsel's belief that 
Crape was uninsured. Furthermore, the record reveals that no 
written consent as required by the Liberty Mutual Insurance 
policy was obtained by the insureds prior to bringing the suit 
against Crape. 
On August 24, 1989, 16 days after receiving 
notification that there might be an uninsured motorist involved, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company sent a letter to the insureds' 
lawyer setting forth its position on all pertinent matters. (R. 
00149.) Liberty Mutual's letter began with an acknowledgement 
that the letter sent by the insureds' counsel of July 12, 1989 
was not received until August 8, 1989. The letter stated: 
This will acknowledge our belated receipt of 
your letter dated July 12, 1989 and its 
enclosures. When you called to discuss it on 
August 8, I advised you that we never 
received the original letter and enclosures 
and you, therefore, faxed copies to me. 
(R. 00149.) The letter then goes on to advise Mr. McRae, the 
insureds' lawyer, that Liberty Mutual was already processing the 
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insureds' no-fault claims and that Joanne Baxter had received 
$3,056.10 in no-fault benefits ($1,278.78 for medical bills and 
the remainder for wage reimbursement), and that Mary Ellen 
Boulter had received a total of $542.24 in no-fault medical 
benefits as of that date. (R. 00149.) It is critical to note that 
as of August 24, 1989, six weeks after filing suit against Mr. 
Crape, neither of the insureds had reached the $3,000 medical 
expense threshold requirement of the Utah No-Fault Act which must 
precede the bringing of a civil action for general damages. That 
fact and its effect relative to Liberty Mutualrs position is 
noted in the August 24, 1989 letter: 
If I understand your intentions, you are 
interested in placing an uninsured motorist 
claim on behalf of each of these two 
claimants, with regard to the above-captioned 
accident. Provided you can show reasonable 
evidence that the responsible party was not 
insured, I do not have a problem with 
honoring such a claim, assuming that the 
injured parties are shown to have crossed the 
Utah No-Fault threshold, which would make 
them eligible to place a liability claim in 
this state. 
As the medical bills which I have paid show that 
your clients have not crossed the no-fault 
threshold by virtue of the amount of medical bills 
incurred to date, perhaps you are able to provide 
me with medical reports which show that they have 
crossed the threshold in one of the other possible 
ways. 
(R. 00149.) Thus, Liberty Mutual advised its insureds, through 
the insureds' counsel, that once they reached the Utah No-Fault 
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Act threshold, either by incurring medical expense or otherwise, 
and when they provided reasonable evidence that an uninsured 
motorist was involved, Liberty Mutual would honor their claim. 
The letter goes on to state that an uninsured motorist claim file 
had been set up for each insured and closed with a statement 
inviting the insureds' counsel to contact Liberty Mutual should 
he have any questions: 
If you have any questions or comments 
regarding this letter in the meantime, please 
do not hesitate to contact me. Otherwise, I 
will await the evidence regarding the 
uninsured motorist situation and the 
eligibility to place the liability claims 
from your office. 
(R. 00150.) 
The record reveals that no additional information 
regarding Mr. Crape/s status as an uninsured motorist, or the 
insureds' status relative to the Utah No-Fault Act tort action 
threshold was provided to Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. The 
next contact between the insureds' counsel and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company came on October 30, 1989. 
On that date, the insureds' lawyer sent a letter to 
Liberty Mutual advising it that a default judgment had been taken 
against Daryl Crape and enclosed a copy of that judgment with the 
letter. The Default Judgment was entered on October 2, 1989 
along with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 00156, the 
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letter from Mr. McRae to Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; R. 00152, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.) 
Significantly, neither the Findings of Fact, nor 
Conclusions of Law, make any reference or mention of Mr. Crape/s 
status as an uninsured motorist. 
The Judgment awarded to Joanne Baxter the sum of 
$25,000 in general damages and the sum of $8,500 to Mary Ellen 
Boulter as general damages. The Judgment also noted that: 
"Neither plaintiff (Baxter or Boulter) makes a claim for special 
damages as the same have been paid by the P.I.P. insurance 
carrier."2 (R. 00154.) The insureds' counsel, Robert M. McRae, 
in the letter of October 30, 1989 inquired as to whether or not 
Liberty Mutual would pay the Default Judgment: 
Please advise as to what you attitude is 
going to be about paying the [Default 
Judgment]. 
(R. 00156.) 
The next contact between Liberty Mutual and the 
insureds occurred when Liberty Mutual filed its action for 
declaratory relief on January 4, 1990. (R. 0002-0009.) The 
Complaint named Joanne Baxter, her husband Jaren Baxter who was 
the primary named insured on the policy, Mary Ellen Boulter, 
2
 The personal injury protection insurance carrier was Liberty 
Mutual. (R. 00149.) 
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Daryl Crape, and John Doe. (R. 0002.) The Complaint sought a 
declaration as to whether: 
1. Daryl Crape was uninsured at the time of 
the accident, 
2. Daryl Craped negligence caused the 
accident, 
3. Baxter or Boulter had met the Utah 
No-Fault threshold requirements 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-309 so as to entitle them to 
maintain an action against Crape, 
4. Boulter and Baxter were entitled to 
uninsured motorist benefits 
pursuant to the pertinent Liberty 
Mutual Insurance policy. 
(R. oooe-7.) Baxter and Boulter answered the Complaint, denying 
most of the allegations and asserting two affirmative defenses. 
The first affirmative defense was that Liberty Mutual's Complaint 
failed to state a cause of action and the second affirmative 
defense was that the Complaint was barred by the doctrines of res 
judicata, laches, and estoppel. (R. 00011.) 
Significantly, in the Answer the insureds admit that 
they failed to provide proof to Liberty Mutual that Mr. Crape was 
uninsured at the time of the accident. (R. 00013.) 
Thereafter, the insureds took one deposition (R. 00024.) 
and then, on March 21, 1990 certified the matter as being ready 
for trial. (R. 00025.) In the Certificate of Readiness for Trial 
the insureds' counsel specifically certified that all required 
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pleadings had been filed and the case was at issue as to all 
parties. (Id.) Counsel for Liberty Mutual immediately filed an 
Objection to the Certification of Readiness for Trial and 
asserted that Daryl Crape had not yet been served3 and that 
additional discovery was necessary. (R. 00027-28.) The trial 
court granted Liberty Mutual7s objection to the trial setting. 
(R. 00039.) Thereafter additional discovery was conducted. (R. 
00032.) Then on July 10, 1990, the insureds moved to amend their 
Answer to add a Counterclaim for Liberty Mutual/s alleged bad 
faith. (R. 00040, Motion to Amend; R. 00042, Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim.) 
The only specific factual allegations set forth in the 
Counterclaim regarding Liberty Mutual's alleged breach of its 
duty to good faith is set forth in paragraph seven and states 
that: 
[Liberty Mutual] has violated its contractual 
duties to counterclaimants in one or more of 
the following respects: 
a. Failure to timely and 
diligently investigate 
its liability exposure to 
its insureds. 
(R. 00043.) The balance of the allegations in the Counterclaim 
merely set forth in conclusory fashion that Liberty Mutual 
3
 Mr. Crape has never been served. 
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breached its fiduciary duties to its insureds without specifying 
exactly how that breach occurred. (R. 00044.) 
Then discovery was conducted by both sides. (R. 00087, 
the insureds' Request for Production of Documents; R. 00090, report of private 
investigator attempting to locate Daryl Crape.) Both sides also made 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 00079, the insureds' Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated December 24, 1990; R. 00118f Liberty Mutual's 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.) 
Liberty Mutual asserted in its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment that the Default Judgment taken in the initial 
liability action by the insureds against Daryl Crape was invalid 
based upon improper service of process (R. 00126.) and that under 
the terms of the Liberty Mutual Insurance policy the original 
Default Judgment was not binding on Liberty Mutual.4 (R. 00129.) 
On March 6, 1991, in a short memorandum decision, the court 
denied Liberty Mutual's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 
00193.) Prior to filing the motion, Liberty Mutual through 
counsel had advised the insureds, through their counsel, that 
Liberty Mutual was prepared to discuss settlement of the matter 
rather than go through the time and expense of motions and trial. 
(R. 00191.) 
4
 This is not the motion from which this appeal was taken. 
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Following the c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n , Libesrty Mutual 
undertook addi t iona l d iscovery . (R. 00198, Liberty Mutual's 
Certificate of Delivery of Discovery in the form of interrogatories.) 
Liberty Mutual sought, through interrogatories, information 
regarding the insureds' damages. Ultimately, Liberty Mutual was 
required to file a Motion to Compel responses to those 
interrogatories, which was granted on July 16, 1991. (R. 00251.) 
On April 3, 1991, Liberty Mutual filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment in the action initiated by the insureds 
against Daryl Crcipe. (R. 00391.) In that motion, Liberty Mutual 
argued that service of process was invalid because personal 
service had not been obtained, and Mr. Crape did not reside at 
the location where service was attempted. (R. 00391-00406.) On 
August 13, 1991, Judge John A. Rokich entered the court's final 
order denying Liberty's motion. (R. 00407.) 
After efforts to locate Mr. Crape failed, and efforts 
to set aside the Default Judgment and enforce certain policy 
provisions had failed, Liberty Mutual determined that it would 
not appeal the earlier rulings and paid to its insureds funds 
sufficient to cover the Judgment, costs, and interest at the 
legal rate from the date of judgment to the date of payment, 
November 15, 1991. (The actual release documents do not appear in the 
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Record of this case. However, at R. 00310 Liberty Mutual asserted in a 
statement of uncontested facts that the funds had been paid and that the 
Default Judgment had been wholly satisfied. That assertion of fact was not 
contested by the insureds.) 
As of November 15, 1991, the only issue which remained 
in the suit was whether Liberty Mutual had somehow breached its 
duty of good faith in the so called "first party" context. On 
November 15, 1991, Liberty Mutual filed its motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 00301.) 
Liberty Mutual sought summary judgment on three 
separate grounds. First, it asserted that neither its conduct 
prior to filing the Complaint for declaratory relief, nor the 
filing of the Complaint for declaratory relief could, as a matter 
of law, constitute a breach of the duty of good faith. (R. 00320-
00326.) Second, it asserted that in any event the insureds had 
suffered no compensable damages. (R. 00326-00330.) Third, the 
insureds were not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of 
law. (R. 00319-00320.) After briefing by both parties, the court 
granted Liberty Mutual7s motion on December 10, 1991, (R. 00454.) 
and on December 23, 1991 entered its Order and Judgment granting 
summary judgment to Liberty Mutual: "For the reasons set forth 
in [Liberty Mutual's] November 15, 1991 Memorandum of Points and 
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Authorities." (R. 00459.) No memorandum decision was issued by 
the court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In the context of a claim for uninsured motorist 
benefits, it is well recognized that the insured, not the 
insurer, must come forward with reasonable evidence that the tort 
feasor was in fact uninsured. By their own admission, the 
insureds provided no evidence that Daryl Crape was uninsured. 
Thus, a condition precedent to coverage had not been met. In 
spite of that, Liberty Mutual timely responded to the insureds7 
counsel's indication that a possible uninsured motorist claim 
existed, requested additional information in a polite and 
appropriate manner, and continued to pay to its insureds the 
benefits that were owed pursuant to the policy. 
In contrast, the insureds, through counsel, never 
actually made a claim, failed to provide their insurer with the 
requested information, filed suit against the tort feasor without 
obtaining the consent of the insurer as was required by the 
policy, obtained a default judgment without first notifying the 
insurer that a default hearing was scheduled, and then simply 
supplied a copy of the Default Judgment to the insurer asking the 
insurer to pay the* Judgment. Under the circumstances, rather 
16 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW LIBERTY 
MUTUAL DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
Althoucjh the insureds7 claim has never been set forth 
in detail, it seems that the claim is based on Liberty Mutual's 
alleged delay when it initially responded to the insureds and 
again when responding to the presentation of the Default 
Judgment.5 Therefore, this section of this brief addresses the 
5
 In their brief at page 15 the insureds state that "The 
thrust, however, of Baxter and Boulter's argument is that Liberty 
Mutual's breach of its duty of good faith began from its conduct 
prior to the filing of the declaratory complaint. The failure to 
timely acknowledge, investigate and correspond to the claim are 
what gives substance to Baxter and Boulter's cause of action." 
Assuming, however, that the insureds now also claim that 
Liberty Mutual's pursuit of the action for declaratory relief was 
also bad faith, Liberty Mutual asserts that in Utah, as long as 
there is a fairly debatable reason in support of the action for 
declaratory relief, then the bringing of such an action cannot 
support a claim of bad faith. See, Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 958 (Utah App. 1989); Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah App. 1987); Western 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marchant, 715 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1980); 
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 237 (Utah 1985). 
The "fairly debatable" reasons that supported Liberty Mutual's 
filing of the Complaint for declaratory relief are adequately set 
forth in the memorandum filed by Liberty mutual in support of its 
motion for partial summary judgment before the trial court in this 
action and its motion to set aside the default judgment in the case 
initiated by the insureds against Daryl Crape. (R. 00118-156, 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated December 28, 1990; R. 
00391-00408, Liberty Mutual's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment.) Furthermore, when the "fairly debatable" reasons 
for bringing the action were resolved, Liberty Mutual paid the 
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Iriw aippl [ c a b l e t o an i n s u r e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n s when f aced wi th a 
e l a LIII s i m i lai: t o tlia I. pi e sen It Il i in I; III i "i. cvise niini I n i l lnesses; ill lie 
p e r t i n e n t f a c t s in l i g h t of t h e i n s u r e r ' s l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s . " ' " 
A. L i b e r t y Mutua l Responded F a i r l y and P r o m p t l y t o t h e 
I n s u r e d s . 
I I/I i II in I r a r s o i y e x a m i n a t i o n nil I hp i n s u r e d s ' 
c o u n s e l ' s L e t t e r 01 J u i y 1 J , n u n w I m i < i m Wilis r e c e i v e d m ," in i in i »P i i y 
Mint-1.,» i
 o n August 8, L9 8 9 r e v e a l s t h a t no r e a l r l a i m was Ibn i IIHJ 
'Hi I ml 1: c»» niifii n I v ii ill" i M'll I Ih i iiinuI I T t h a t t h e i n s u r e d s 
haul lulled s u i t a g a i n s t t h e l.oi I l e a s e r ainl t ha t maybe t lie I ut t 
f e a s o r was u n i n s u r e d , The WI,JMI r l a i m i s never used Nni demand 
u,*y uieii1 > ' " i ,| >n l i , i i i i i ' i isi* M'1 f«>" i " i 11 ' i i i 
i n s u r e r u n d e r t a k e an i n v e s t i g a t i o n \h, uni44 , .« ..; i s c l e a t i i* urn 
I  1 1 1 » f » r I \" II" "Il II I 111 in II '" i i r s p o n s e i n «111 y c . l a t e r 111 i n v e s t i g a t i o n was 
u n d e r t a k e n nil I i li wa«.i nt-l nip iniil \uU\ 11 n ikil in 1111 it mim I m in i!1. 
requested. Thus, the insurer did exactly what the Insureds 
i eq ties ted. 
I nsureds' c] a :i it, plus interest and court costs. Lastly, it should 
be noted that the insureds' Counterclaim did not assert a breach of 
the duty of good faith based upon the filing of the Complaint for 
declaratory relief. (R. 00042-00045.) • • 
h
 The insureds' claim, is a so called, "f,i rst party" bad, fa i th 
claim. See, Becic v. Farmers Ins. Exchange 70,1 P. 2d 795, 801 (U tcii 1: „ 
1985). 
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Even assuming that the July 12, 1989 letter is 
construed to be a claim for uninsured motorist coverage benefits, 
Liberty Mutual had every right to respond requesting additional 
information. First, the insureds had not met the Utah No-Fault 
Act threshold for bringing an action for general damages and 
second, when making an uninsured motorist claim, the burden is on 
the insured to come forward with reasonable evidence that the 
tort feasor is in fact uninsured. Courts from across the nation 
have so held. 
For example, in Griffith v. Farm and City Ins. Co., 324 
N.W.2d 327 (Iowa 1982) the court held: 
It is generally recognized that in order for 
an insured to recover under uninsured 
motorist coverage, the insured bears the 
burden of proving the uninsured status of the 
other motorist or vehicle. (Numerous 
citations omitted.) 
Id. at 329-330. Again in LaFeve v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 
527 F.Supp. 492 (Dist. of Alabama 1981) the court held: 
It is clear that a party making a claim for 
uninsured motorist coverage must prove that 
the vehicle which injured him was in fact 
uninsured. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 495. See also, Abraham v. Great American Ins. Co., 21 
Ohio Misc. 170, 256 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ohio 1972); Macaluso v. 
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 188 S.2d 178, 180 (La. App. 1966); 
26 A.L.R. 3d 883, 892, Insurance—"Uninsured" Motorist, § 4. 
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Tn this ra .( 1 In1 insureds presented no evidence, 
I fcid fc>< i l l l e t I i i t " i i I i l»t l h , J I 111 in ' i i i 1 mi in'I mi 1 mi i ' l i : l f . " in 11 mi mi mi in mi I i i l l mi mi i l l 1 - " in mi " , , - I • 
In l i q h t of t h a t , L i b e r t y Mutual was under no u b l i g a t i o r i t o do 
more t h a n i t d id was set up, a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n was 
r e q u e s t e d , ami I hi. - i l s , Ihiinnili ini i i i ' t 1 WHI tj iiilh11 '•a?il I In il 
L i b e r t y Mutual s t o o d r e a d y t o honor t h e c l a i m if and when 
r e a s o n a b l e e v i d e n c e of t h e o tne r d r i v e r ' s u n i n s u r e d s t a t u s was 
p r o v i d e d , \R HIUMI I.II JI l"he i of i n i.1, asbujiuncj l l n l I In l l tdlci 
r e c e i v e d by L i b e r t y Mutual on Auqusf Ef 1989 was a " c l a i m " f o r 
ii ' 11 s111 PII mot' ir i s t i mi11! ai'jv I i I * • ? I M111 11 i l i *.". pon< h' I 111 i 
f a s h i o n e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i th i t s r i g h l s under t h e law, M l 
t h a t I IIF i n s u r e d s had t o <ln was t o p r o v i d e some e v i d e n c e , any 
i'\i i i l t in i
 ( 1 l i i i I mi i i II in I IMIIiii i in ) | i u i i i ) ii in i l l i II II i i i i i u l II l l i f i n a i l 1)1 IL I i 
i . • : t a r spec i f I c damages. As i s s e t for th in L ibe r ty _ Mutua l ' s 
August 24, x^o=r r e spons ive l e t t e r (R. 00149-00150. i „ l i b e r t y Mutual 
would have honored t h e e ld LIII, I n s t e a d , without Lurther 
n o t i f i c a t i o n to Liber ty Mutual, the insured took, a d e f a u l t 
i't 1 q in i " i in I a i -i, a, i mi II " > I I I mi "l!'" i « \ \ i * * < in 11 11 I I in *' 11 »•"' ' M I » f l » I »Jl d I II i mi i II in in in i M" t i ) 
automatically, and without further questions, satisfy that 
judgment, when evidence that Mr, Crape was uninsured still had 
" Liberty also questioned whether the Insureds were legally 
untitled to make a c3 ai m against Crape due to Utah Code Ann § 31 ft -
2 2-3 09 
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not been provided. The condition precedent to coverage, i.e., 
the existence of an uninsured motorist, had not been established. 
The coverage was never implicated, and Liberty Mutual had no duty 
to do anything other than what is reflected in its August 24, 
1989 letter. (R. 00149-00150.) See, cases cited at page 20, 
supra. 
Later, after obtaining the Default Judgment, once again 
it is questionable whether a claim was even presented. The 
insureds' counsel merely requested that the insurer: "Advise as 
to what your attitude is going to be about paying the same." (R. 
00156.) Assuming, however, that the insureds' counsel's letter is 
construed as a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, once again 
the insureds failed to provide any reasonable evidence that Mr. 
Crape was uninsured. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by 
Judge Rokich contained no reference to Mr. Crape being uninsured. 
(R. 00152-00154.) No additional evidence was provided with the 
letter. (R. 00156.) Furthermore, Liberty Mutual's policy clearly 
and unequivocally stated that in order for any judgment obtained 
by the insured against an uninsured motorist to be binding upon 
Liberty Mutual, the insured must first obtain the written consent 
of Liberty Mutual. (R. 00142, which is a photocopy of the relevant page 
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of Liberty Mutual's policy I No such consent was obtained. 
Therefore, once again Liberty Mutual was under no obligation to 
take immediate action and h -id a lawful and fairly debateable good 
II ijii ii t Hi i easoiri I in 11 s 'undueI I'll iiii in < 11 > i ec,|u i r e d Si:1" -•**•> , 
Ca 11 ioux v, Progress i ve 71i,'i « '" , " 4 b F", i d & ,'18 8 4 2 (Utah App. 
1II9JH ji ('held: "Where factual issues exist regarding the claim's 
a 1  in i,l ii i ,j|
 ( IIII i iiburfcM "" e r e t us a II I | i | I Hi '" I ii i IIII "ill j e e IIII I 
constitute bad faith even where the factual Issues are ultimately 
resolved in favor of the insured." summary Judgment in favor of 
the insurer nip he 1 il |i 
The? ill iiii Court of Appeals' position i s consistent with 
iln'i i LI r isd ii't ions In r* • v State Farm, 437 F i 2d 3 6 5 , 
f b t i - 3 ii) ( b t h L i i . II i i1 I I  t h e L I Ji 1 h e l d 111 ill I h i Il i i i . i u i i i i II m 11 I  
commit bad f a i t h by re fus ing t o s a t i s f y a judgment ob ta ined by 
I li in II ii1 iii up 11 ,1111(1 subm i t II t II mi II 1111 i i i i i i r is in Md moi on i n t c o v e r a g e w h e i e 
I In-; i usurer con te s t ed the v<t 1 11J 11 y nL judgment ll Nummary 
Judgment in favor ut tin insure r was a f f i r m e d . ) - Icf. Again in 
Myrt i I hi ii- if t\ nr f F i i M I in. » II in II n | i | i l II "HI, 
of P a . 1981) the court lie J d that even «* tiej ii the insurer luses an 
action for declaratory relief, il a reasonable argument was 
p r e s e n t e d , t h e n H i e i iiiMit e i tlnni m i l i <i ' i'liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii j » 
judgment in favor of the insuier was aff i rmed. Id, 
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It should be noted that throughout this entire process 
the insured was represented by competent counsel and was not at a 
disadvantage regairding the relative expertise of the parties. 
Faced with the insureds' default judgment on one hand 
and the many available defenses to that judgment on the other, 
Liberty referred the matter to counsel on December 27, 1989 (60 
days after the receipt of the Default Judgment) and on January 4, 
1990 the Complaint for Declaratory Relief was filed. (R. 00295-
00296, Affidavit of counsel for Liberty Mutual, Michael P. Zaccheo.) 
Certainly, under Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 
P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) in an uninsured motorist context, both 
the insurer and the insured have a duty to deal with each other 
in good faith and from the insurer's perspective that duty 
includes an obligation to diligently investigate the claim. Id. 
However, when the insurer responds to an insured's overture 
within 16 days and requests additional information which it is 
entitled to and acknowledges the insured's right to bring a claim 
when certain lawful conditions precedent are met, that duty is 
fulfilled. Callioux, supra. Additionally, the insurer is under 
no obligation to immediately and without pursuing its lawful 
remedies pay a default judgment obtained by the insured. 
Phillips v. State Farm, supra. Finally, the duty of good faith 
does not prevent the insurer from exercising its legal right to 
24 
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a c t i o n l o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e I 11 t . T h i s i. mill IHHUJI 1 I in.11l (i m i m 111 I i 
in Wes te rn Casualty & Surety Co, i Marchant, 6 15 P. 2d 4 2.1 11II ah 
1  "l HI 11 ml ' I i n i t I I n I ill 
It would not comport with our ideas of either 
law or justice to prevent any party that 
entertains bona fide questions about his 
legal obligations from seeking adjudication 
thereon in the courts. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 427, w o at bd, Farmers 1 us , Exchange v , Cal I, i 1 2: I 2d 
231 # 23i"'" (Utah 1985) , 
""I'll i n "iii in i Mill, in L« I i . -n i l i in ill II II in mi in II i r i H ill II ill n i l H I Jl 
Commission Ru les t o e s t a b l i s h a b r e a c h ot I htj du ty ot good f a i t h 
i s m i s p l a c e d (Brief of Appellant at page in | I l i s t , tin* s t a t u t e 
i J 1 1 1 J e ill i Il in i mi II i II II i n i ' I I I • 1 1 1 mi 1 1 ill i i « i , u j [ i 1 1 i n i s , , 1 1 1 1 1 1 i mi in 1 1 1 II 11 i i in J" e d II 
promulgate such rules specifically states that: "This section 
does nut create any private cansp of action " Utah rm|p Ann 
\ I 1 A - i l l J i i . I I "". ji | I'JB ' I III n l I  II i IIII Ill II Mij i 11 i l i n o n i l f i n l u i l I  11 
control che insurer's standard of conduct tor purposes of an 
independent, u i v n dctiua based upon alleged bad faith t1 r* u id 
t.dve aone so in nlpar terms f as have o* |w*i i;lales, " * 11 »• - j linn 
excluding •/. standard from giving rise to a11 independent civil 
8
 For example, the Tennessee legislature enacted a statutor y 
scheme to control insurer bad faith. See, Squires v. Republ ic 1 ns " 
C o . , 572 F. 2d =*0. 561 -62 (6th • 1978) (construi ng Tennessee bad 
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Second, the Insurance Commission Rules relied on by the 
insureds, Rule 540-89-10, 11 and 12, are each premised upon the 
insured first making a "claim." The Rules specifically define 
"claim" as a request for a demand for payment of benefits 
according to the terms of the insurance policy. See, Utah 
Insurance Regulations, R 540-89-4.B. In this case, as has 
already been set forth, no "claim" as defined by the Insurance 
Commission Rules was ever made. 
Third, each of the rules relied upon by the insured set 
forth times within which the insurer must respond, "unless such 
investigation cannot reasonably be completed within such time." 
Utah Insurance Regulations. R 540-89-10, 11, and 12.9 Thus, the 
Rules require the same standard of care as do€*s the case law: 
reasonable conduct. 
faith law, T.C.A. § 56-1105(A).) 
9
 Liberty Mutual responded to the first letter from the 
insured's counsel 16 days after receipt of that letter. Giving the 
insured every benefit of the doubt, the Insurance Commission 
regulation required a response within 15 days, unless some other 
period was required. In light of the fact that the insureds 
presented no evidence that the tort feasor was uninsured, and did 
not make a demand for payment, a 24 hour additional delay should 
not be considered to form the basis of a bad faith claim. With 
regard to Liberty Mutual7s response to the submission of the 
Default Judgment, Liberty Mutual asserts that even if it was 
required to respond within 30 days, instead of approximately 60 
days, under the circumstances because Liberty Mutual intended to 
deny the claim in any event, the 3 0 day delay caused no damages to 
the insured beyond accrued interest, which was ultimately paid. 
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In summary, in this rase the insureds failed to 
e s t a b l i s h a c o n u j t mri \n eceue im i n i I N I \ \\\\\ iiiiiiiii i i i i i i i i iiiiiiiiii | iiiiiii 
forward Liberty Mut.ua 1 was untitled to await further information 
which nil mill satisfy thn condition precedent before responding to 
llu« i iLtim, in spite L4 Lhdt Liil it lenient , i I »i. i I
 J( II I ill | i iiiipl ly 
responded to the Insureds' counsel, advised of the need for 
in mi t i mi IIII t1 inn iiiiiiii ii 1 in a/1 ipilqi'il | lii"' i n s u r e d s * r i q h t t o p r e s e n t a 
claim when that additional information was provided Mi i (.'a 1 ter, 
the insurer filed am action for declaratory relief seeking a 
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parties. Liberty Mulual's conduct was appropriate and did not -: . 
constitute a breach of the duty of good faith. 
B. Liberty Mu tual Effectively Balanced competing Concerns in 
this Case, 
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a delicate balance to maintain on tho one hand the insurer must 
continue to deal fairly and honestlv with its insured, while on 
) l h o i : III I . I in in i II I IIIIIII II I L i n i i i i i l l i I II i ' i l l I  11 i i i i i i i I  \ IIIIIIII II i s s e i I i I I 
defenses that might be available to the uninsured motorist, See, 
Hendren v A i istate Ins. Co., v,, * A . ^ U ^^~,, , ^^^^ -*^
 v;»e.w Mex. 
Ann, II 983) • 
10
 The court stated: "We recognize that an insurer has a dual 
role with respect to uninsured motorist coverage. The hybrid 
nature of the role which an insurer who provides uninsured motorist 
coverage assumes has caused a fragmented body of case .1 aw to emerge 
2 7 
Liberty Mutual, in its response of August 24, 1989, 
appropriately maintained this delicate balance by advising the 
insured of the additional information which was required and the 
potential legal defense (the tort threshold requirement) to the 
claim and at the same time acknowledging that should such 
information be forthcoming, the insurer would honor the claim and 
had set up a file to do so. Unfortunately, the insureds decided 
to pursue their own option, that of obtaining a default judgment 
after arguably improper service of process, and thereby 
occasioned the long and issue-laden delay about which they now 
complain. 
At every critical point in the development of this 
claim Liberty Mutual had a fairly debatable r€»ason for its 
action. Initially, Liberty Mutual had not becm presented with a 
proper demand. Then, no evidence of the tort feasor's uninsured 
status was submitted when the burden to submit such evidence was 
upon the insured. Also, the insureds had not met the Utah No-
Fault tort threshold, a defense that would have been available to 
in which courts consider the duty owed by the insurer to the 
insured with varying results. (Citations omitted.) The difficulty 
arises because the insurer, on the one hand, sold the policy, and 
thus has an obligation to its insured, unlike third party coverage 
situations. On the other hand, however, the insurer assumes an 
adversary role as to questions involving the uninsured motorist's 
negligence and any available defenses he might have." Id., see 
also, Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565, 569 (7th 
Cir. 1978). 
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the uninsured motorist and which the insurer was lawfully 
entitled to assert against the claim, assuming one had been made. 
Then the Default Judgment was obtained without Liberty Mutual's 
written consent which was required by the policy and furthermore 
the validity of the Judgment was reasonably challengeable on 
grounds of improper service of process. Finally, Liberty filed 
an action for declaratory relief seeking to resolve all of the 
issues and when those issues were resolved, satisfied the 
Judgment, with interest and court costs. Under the authorities 
set forth herein, supra, such conduct does not constitute, as a 
matter of law, bad faith.11 
POINT II 
THE INSUREDS HAVE SUFFERED 
NO COMPENSABLE DAMAGES 
This appeal arises from a so called first party bad 
faith claim. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985). In the first party context, the duties and obligations of 
the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. Id. at 800. 
In the first party situation, the damages recoverable for a 
11
 Utah courts have not been reluctant to resolve the issue of 
insurer bad faith on motions for summary judgment. See, Pixton v. 
State Farm, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989); Callioux v. Progressive 
Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). 
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breach of the contract are general damages and consequential 
damages only. Id. at 801; see also, Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 423 (Utah App. 1989). No independent tort 
has been alleged in this case and the record would not support 
such an allegation. (R. 00042-00045.) In this situation, punitive 
damages are not civailable under Beck. See, Beck, 701 P.2d at 
801; Canyon Country Store, 781 P.2d at 423. Damages for mental 
anguish are generally not available. Id. at 802. With regard to 
mental anguish dcimages, the court in Beck stated: 
Clearly, damages will not be available for 
the mere disappointment, frustration or 
anxiety normally experienced in the process 
of filing an insurance claim and negotiating 
a settlement with an insurer. 
Id. at 802. 
In this case the insureds are entitled to those damages 
directly flowing from the alleged breach, i.e., the satisfaction 
of the Default Judgment plus interest which has already occurred, 
and those consequential damages which the parties might 
reasonably foresee would occur as a result of the alleged breach. 
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
In this case it was the insureds' burden to come 
forward with competent evidence that would establish with 
reasonable certainty the damages allegedly sustained. See, 
Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). If it 
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appeared to the trial court based upon the pleadings and the 
insureds7 answers to interrogatories that no compensable damages 
were sustained and that the insureds could not, as a matter of 
law, recover regardless of their contention of damages, then 
summary judgment was appropriate. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 
905, 907 (Utah 1975) (wherein the court stated: "If from the 
pleadings and any appropriate supportive materials, it appears as 
a matter of law, that not withstanding what a party contends, he 
could not recover, the trial court can so rule." Id.) 
In this case, the insureds' Counterclaim does not spell 
out what actual damages were sustained by either of the insureds. 
The Counterclaim simply states that as a result of Liberty 
Mutual's failure to act in good faith, Liberty Mutual is 
"obligated to counterclaimants for actual and consequential 
damages in a sum not less than $1 million as general damages." 
(R. 00044.) Therefore, Liberty Mutual attempted to discover 
exactly what the nature of counterclaimants damages were through 
interrogatories designed to explore that issue. In Liberty 
Mutual's first set of interrogatories the insureds were asked to 
outline each and every out-of-pocket expense they incurred as a 
result of the alleged breach of the duty of good faith. (R. 
00231, interrogatory number three.) In response, not a single item of 
damages regarding Jaren Baxter or Mary Ellen Boulter was set 
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forth. Additionally, the only damages alluded to with regard to 
Joanne Baxter were for mental anguish without a single dollar 
amount specified,, (R. 00231-233, the insureds' response to Liberty 
Mutual's interrogatories.) 
Because the insureds' answers to interrogatories were 
inadequate, Liberty Mutual filed a Motion to Compel and the trial 
court subsequently ordered on July 16, 1991 that the insureds 
respond fully to the interrogatories. (R. 00251.) The only 
supplemental response that was forthcoming consisted of five 
handwritten pages of notes reflecting visits by Joanne Baxter to 
doctors and physical therapists including a mileage charge for 
those visits and charge for an increased rate to procure new 
automobile insurance. (R. 00414-00419.) Although no specific 
information was provided, presumably Joanne Baxter's visits to 
the doctor and physical therapist arose out of her physical 
injuries sustained in the accident with Daryl Crape. Such 
damages do not flow naturally and foreseeably from Liberty 
Mutual's alleged breach of the duty of good faith, but rather 
flow naturally and foreseeably from the automobile accident with 
Mr. Crape.n 
12
 Pursuant to the personal injury protection benefits section 
of the Liberty Mutual policy, Liberty Mutual paid to Joanne Baxter 
a total amount of $3,356.10 as of August 24, 1989. Whether some 
portion of these funds were included in the answers to 
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Liberty Mutual submitted the answers to interrogatories 
to the trial court in support of its motion for summary judgment 
and argued that the insureds' showing was inadequate and that as 
a matter of law, no entitlement to damages could be shown. (R. 
00326-00329.) At that point, had the insureds wanted to present 
additional information to the court they could have done so. 
However, no such additional information was forthcoming and the 
trial court accurately determined that no entitlement to damages 
could be shown.13 
POINT III 
THE INSUREDS WERE NOT ENTITLED 
TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
As has been discussed supra at 29. Under Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, the insureds in this case were not 
entitled to punitive damages unless an independent tort had been 
alleged and proved. No such tort was alleged and nor could it be 
interrogatories is not apparent. 
13
 Joanne Baxter's supposed claim for mental anguish was 
completely unsupported and under the circumstances amounted to no 
more than the mere disappointment, frustration and anxiety normally 
experienced in the process of filing an insurance claim and as 
such, was not compensable. Beck, 701 P.2d at 802. 
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proved. (R. 00042-00046.) See also, Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d at 423; Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) (a) (1989).14 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's decision granting summary judgment to Liberty Mutual and 
dismissing the insureds7 claims of bad faith. 
DATED t h i s £? day of j/j/l^ , 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Midhael F>-2^ccheo 
Attorneys for Appellee 
14
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1) (a) (1989) requires that the 
insured set forth by clear and convincing evidence that the 
insurer's conduct manifested and knowing and reckless indifference 
towards and disregard of the rights of the insureds. No such 
allegation was set forth in the Counterclaim in this case. (R. 
00042-00046.) 
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